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INTRODUCTION
Generating and testing procedures for
controlling spacecraft subsystems composed of
electro-mechanical and computationally realized
elements has become a very difficult task.
Before a spacecraft can be flown, mission
controllers must envision a great variety of
situations the flight crew may encounter during
a mission and carefully construct procedures for
operating the spacecraft in each possible
situation. If, despite extensive pre-compilation
of control procedures, an unforeseen situation
arises during a mission, the mission controller
must generate a new procedure for the flight
crew in a limited amount of time. In such
situations, the mission controller cannot
systematically consider and test alternative
procedures against models of the system being
controlled, because the available simulator is too
large and complex to reconfigure, run, and
analyze quickly. A rapidly reconfigurable
simulation environment that can execute a
control procedure and show its effects on system
behavior would greatly facilitate generation and
testing of control procedures both before and
during a mission.
There are several requirements that must be
met by such a simulation system:
• Reconfigurability -- During a mission, the
state of a component may change due to a fault
or an unforeseen external event. During the
design process, changes in the design of a
physical system, which may occur
concurrently with the design of an operating
procedure, may require a modification to the
procedure. For these reasons, it must be easy
to change the simulation model to reflect the
variety of configurations and conditions under
which the spacecraft will be operated.
• Simulation with imprecise or incomplete
information -- Exact and complete numerical
data about the state of the system may not be
available during design or in the presence of a
fault. For example, when a leak is detected,
the exact size of the leak is unlikely to be
known. Therefore, the simulator must be able
to predict behavior even if precise quantitative
information about the state of the system is not
available. If it is not possible to predict the
behavior unambiguously, it should at least be
able to produce a range of possible behaviors.
• Explanation -- When procedures produce
unexpected results, it is difficult to interpret
the raw simulation data, which may consist of
values of hundreds of state variables in each of
many states. The simulator should be able to
produce a high-level, causal explanation of the
simulation results, summarizing the salient
information for the user and for
documentation.
The How Things Work project at Stanford
University has developed a system called DME
(Device Modeling Environment) for modeling
and simulating the behavior of electro-
mechanical devices [1]. DME was designed to
facilitate model formulation and behavior
simulation of device behavior including both
continuous and discrete phenomena. We are
currently extending DME for use in testing
operator procedures, and we have built a
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knowledge base for modeling the Reaction
Control System (RCS) of the space shuttle as a
testbed. We believe that DME can facilitate
design of operator procedures by providing
mission controllers with a simulation
environment that meets all these requirements.
DME: THE RAPIDLY
RECONFIGURABLE MODELING AND
SIMULATION SYSTEM
DME is an evolving prototype of a
"designer's associate" system, intended to
support the design of electro-mechanical devices
by providing effective tools for simulating and
analyzing the behavior of such devices [2]. The
DME system is intended as an experimental
testbed and foundation on which to build new
representation and reasoning capabilities. DME
has already been developed to a sufficient level
of maturity to provide both a demonstration
vehicle and a useful experimental testbed within
the project. Currently, DME provides the
following capabilities:
Model formulation: DME uses the given
information about the structure of a device to
generate a mathematical model of its behavior.
DME has knowledge of the physical phenomena
in the domain, represented as model fragments
in CML [3], a compositional modeling language
developed jointly by leading members of the
qualitative reasoning research community. Each
model fragment describes a particular aspect of
a conceptually distinct physical phenomenon in
terms of the conditions under which it occurs
and the consequences of its occurrence.
Given the structure of a device in terms of its
components and their connections along with the
conditions that hold in an initial state, DME
formulates a mathematical model of the
behavior of the device by composing applicable
model fragments and simulates the behavior.
We have also been developing techniques for
automatically formulating a simulation model
that embodies the abstractions, approximations,
assumptions, and perspectives that are
appropriate for a given analysis task [4].
Simulation: DME uses the model it generates to
perform behavior simulation. When sufficient
numerical information is available, simulation is
carried out numerically. Otherwise, it simulates
behavior qualitatively. In both cases, DME can
simulate a mixture of continuous and discrete
phenomena.
Explanation: On the basis of an initial device
model and the behavioral predictions obtained
through simulation, DME can answer a range of
user queries about the structure and behavior of
the modeled system [5]. An important element
of the explanation approach in DME is the use
of the simulator's models, rather than ad hoc
"causal models" that are built specifically for
explanation generation. In explaining how
things work, people do use causal terminology.
However, when analyzing the behavior of
devices, engineers use formalisms such as
logical and mathematical constraints that are not
causal. DME infers causal dependencies among
modeled parameters by analyzing logical and
mathematical constraints.
Reasoning about functions: Understanding
how a device works requires knowledge of both
its intended function and its actual behavior.
DME provides a representation formalism,
called CFRL, for specifying intended
functionality and a verification mechanism to
determine whether a simulated behavior
achieves an intended function [6].
USE OF DME FOR OPERATOR
PROCEDURE VERIFICATION IN THE
RCS
We have built a DME knowledge base for
modeling the Reaction Control System (RCS) of
the space shuttle, and we are extending DME to
do simulation and evaluation of operator
procedures. The RCS is the system of thrusters
that are used to control the attitude of the space
shuttle while it is in orbit. Oxygen and fuel are
fed to the RCS jets from separate tanks. The
thrusters do not have pumps; instead the flow is
maintained by keeping the tanks pressurized
with helium. Each tank has a dedicated helium
supply tank to maintain pressurization.
Mission controllers have carefully
constructed procedures for operating the RCS
under a variety of conditions. For instance, if a
leak in the RCS is detected, then two procedures
are employed to secure the system and identify
the location of the leak. In order to secure the
system, the astronaut must close all of the RCS
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valves. The RCS secure procedure is to first
close the valves nearest the thrusters and then to
proceed upstream toward the helium tank until
all of the valves have been closed. Once the
system has been secured, the isolation
procedure is to check the pressure in each of the
segments between the closed valves. If the
pressure in a particular segment is decreasing,
then the leak has been isolated to that segment.
Even with procedures that seem simple, it is
difficult to foresee the resulting interactions with
the physical system. For instance, consider an
alternative RCS secure procedure in which
valves are closed in the opposite direction,
starting with the main valve closest to the
helium tank proceeding downstream towards the
thrusters. Such a procedure is preferable for
many systems -- as soon as the first (main) valve
is closed, further propellant loss is prevented. In
the RCS, however, this alternate procedure will
result in cavitation inside the thrusters, leading
to catastrophic damage.
Therefore, it is necessary to systematically
test control procedures against models of the
physical systems. When the execution of the
procedure is simulated, the results need to be
evaluated against the expected outcome of the
procedure. At the time of this writing, DME has
successfully formulated a behavior model of the
RCS and simulated its behavior, given the
specification of the RCS structure and initial
conditions for the simulation. During
simulation, DME allows the user to insert faults,
such as leaks, or perform operator actions, such
as opening and closing valves, to influence the
course of behavior. As soon as any such
changes are made, DME reformulates the model
and continues simulating with the updated
model. In this manner, DME has successfully
predicted the results of the correct and incorrect
valve closing sequences as described above in
the presence of a leak.
We are currently extending DME in the
following ways to enhance its support for
procedure testing:
1) Develop the formal semantics of hybrid
continuous and discrete models. This work is
being carded out in collaboration with a team
from the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center.
2) Extend the simulation mechanism to execute
procedures automatically during simulation.
3) Expand CFRL to represent operator
procedures and the intended effects of the
procedures, which may not be explicit in the
specification of the procedure itself.
4) Extend the verification mechanism to use the
CFRL representation of operator procedures
to verify whether the intended functions of a
procedure are achieved in any given
simulated _'ajectory of the system behavior.
An important type of knowledge about
engineered devices is knowledge of its intended
functions. Similarly, an important part of
knowledge about operator procedures is
knowledge of the function of the procedure, in
other words, what the procedure is supposed to
accomplish and how. CFRL was originally
developed to represent device functions, but we
believe it is also suitable for representing
functions of operator procedures.
Figure 1 shows part of the proposed CFRL
representation of the operator procedure to be
invoked when over-pressurization of a
propellant tank ($tk) is detected with both of the
pressure regulators ($rega and Sregb) open.
Following the detection of the condition (node
nO), the operator is to close the valves ($va and
$vb) of both regulators (nl) and to open the
thruster (n2), causing a decrease in the tank
pressure (n3). When the pressure drops below
300 psi (n4), the operator is to reopen the valve
of regulator A (n5). If the failure of regulator A
is not detected by some other procedure (n7)
within 60 seconds (n6), the operator is to
conclude it is regulator B that has failed (n8).
The importance of functional knowledge
extends not only to physical devices but also to
virtual devices such as operator procedures. In
the context of heterogeneous systems composed
of electro-mechanical devices and control
elements including digital computers and
humans, operator procedures are as much a part
of the system as any other physical component.
It is important to evaluate the procedures under a
variety of conditions, and such evaluation
requires knowledge of their intended functions.
We believe DME can facilitate the design of
operator procedures by providing a means to
explicitly represent a mission controller's
intentions underlying a procedure and a useful
simulation environment to evaluate whether a
procedure achieves those intentions.
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Figure 1. CFRL representation of an operator
procedure
SUMMARY
In order to facilitate generation of
procedures for operating complex dynamic
spacecraft subsystems in a variety of expected
and unexpected situations, it is essential to
provide a modeling and simulation mechanism
that can be quickly tailored to reflect a new
configuration of the system being modeled.
DME allows the user to change the system
specification easily by altering the design or
inserting faults to reflect a new situation.
Reconfigurability of DME models comes from
using compositional modeling technology.
DME generates a new simulation model based
on the altered specification and simulates the
operator actions to predict the system behavior
resulting from the actions. Such a facility will
not only allow mission controllers to verify the
safety of new procedures quickly, thereby
avoiding unforeseen negative side effects, but
also will be an essential component in a future
automatic procedure generation and testing
system.
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